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KELO COMPENSATION: THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT TAKINGS
BENJAMIN A. HOUSEHOLDER*
[N]or shall private property be taken for a public use, without just com-
pensation.
-Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution
INTRODUCTION
The power of eminent domain can be described as a necessary evil, a
tool that has been sustained for centuries based on the premise that the ends
will justify the means. This principle has permeated takings jurisprudence, I
and even the Constitution itself.2 Therefore, on June 23, 2005, when the
Supreme Court announced in Kelo v. City of New London that condemning
private property for an economic purpose passes constitutional muster, 3 it
was not a shock to the legal academy. Traditionally, the United States fed-
eral government and states have been able to use the power of eminent
domain 4 for such "public use[s]" as building roads, schools, and railroads. 5
The Kelo decision, however, interprets "public use ' 6 to mean "public pur-
pose" and has thereby broadened, without much limitation, the scope of
what may justify an exercise in eminent domain.7 In other words,
"[n]othing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007; B.A., Political Science, University of
Wisconsin-Madison, 2004. 1 would like to thank Professor Daniel W. Hamilton for his advice and
overall inspiration for this note, and Katie Vikingstad for her noteworthy patience and editorial contri-
bution.
I. I will examine takings jurisprudence in great detail in later sections of this note.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488-90 (2005).
4. Eminent domain is the state power to appropriate property from a private owner for a public
use or purpose. See id. at 472; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
5. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477 ("[lt is ... clear that a State may transfer property from one private
party to another if future 'use by the public' is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a
railroad with common-carrier duties is a familiar example.").
6. This is the specific language used in the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7. The Kelo holding expressly states what has been implied since 1954. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233 (1984) (involving the redistribution of fee title for "public purpose"); Ber-
man v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32, 35 (1954) (involving the removal of blight for a "public purpose").
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Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory." 8 Con-
trary to the legal academy, many private property owners were outraged by
this holding.9
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution expressly lim-
its the state power of eminent domain by (1) requiring that the property be
"taken for a public use" and (2) insuring that the condemnee receives "just
compensation."' 10 The Kelo holding, however, has severely undermined the
protection that is afforded by the Public Use Clause of the takings doctrine
by interpreting "use" to effectively mean "purpose." l l Accordingly, the
dissenters in Kelo went as far as to say the majority opinion stripped the
Public Use Clause of all meaning, 12 thereby paving a smooth road for hun-
gry developers to devise a "carefully considered" plan' 3 to increase tax
revenue, create jobs, and fatten their pockets. This frightens American pri-
vate property owners because it jeopardizes their future ownership rights.
The attitude can be described as reasonably selfish. But creating new job
opportunities and increasing local tax revenue can, as this note will explain,
be a very good thing, and the public benefits of such "carefully considered"
development plans should not be ignored. Further, there is still one major
bump on the road, which is the "just compensation" that must be paid to the
condemnee whose property is taken.
Recently, the United States House of Representatives passed legisla-
tion, H.R. 4128, which proposes to deny federal funds to local municipali-
ties using eminent domain to transfer property from one set of private
owners to another. 14 However, the House legislation appears to completely
ignore the public benefits of using eminent domain for economic develop-
8. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 503 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
9. Adam Karlin, A Backlash on Seizure of Property, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 6,
2005, at I ("In the wake of the Kelo ruling, property-rights crusaders have responded through grass-
roots activism and elected officials. Bills and amendments that would limit use of eminent domain were
generated in state legislatures and Congress within days of the Supreme Court decision."); see With
Governor's Signature Today, Alabama Will Become First State to Curb Eminent Domain Abuse After
Kelo, Aug. 3, 2005, INST. FOR JUST., http://www.ij.org/private-property/castle/8-3_05pr.html (last
visited Jan. 8, 2007) ("Poll after poll shows Americans virtually united against eminent domain for
private profit.").
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484 (deeming economic development a valid "public use" or "public pur-
pose" under the Constitution).
12. Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("To reason, as the Court does, that the incidental public
benefits resulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private property render economic development
takings 'for public use' is to wash out any distinction between private and public use of property-and
thereby effectively to delete the words 'for public use' from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment."); id. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("If. . . 'economic development' takings are for a 'public
use,' any taking is, and the Court has erased the Public Use Clause from our Constitution ... .
13. Id. at 478 (majority opinion).
14. H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005).
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ment, and instead focuses only on the negatives. 15 Supporters of the bill
claimed that this legislation would "make local governments think twice
about condemning privately owned houses and other non-blighted property
so it can be transferred to private developers."'16 Although this "think
twice" objective is an appropriate end, the means are misguided. In Kelo,
for example, the anticipated benefits of the Pfizer development project' 7
were enormous. 18 The Pfizer Project was "expected to generate approxi-
mately between: (1) 518 and 867 construction jobs; (2) 718 and 1362 direct
jobs; and (3) 500 and 940 indirect jobs."' 19 Furthermore, the Pfizer Project
was "expected to generate between $680,544 and $1,249,843 in [annual]
property tax revenues" for New London. 20 Rather than praying for legisla-
tion that eliminates potential benefits for everybody, 21 the supporters of the
bill should concentrate on creating a more balanced method of economic
development takings that preserves the benefit to the community and at the
same time prevents the condemnee from suffering a loss that is grossly
disproportional to the surrounding gains.22 One way to achieve this balance
is by reinterpreting the Just Compensation Clause to take into account more
than just the fair market value of the property taken.23
Because of Kelo, many United States citizens now see eminent do-
main as a serious threat to their property rights. 24 The notion that the prod-
15. See id. at 7-8.
16. Kenneth Harney, On Capital Hill, a Move to Curb Eminent Domain, WASH. POST, Nov. 5,
2005, at Fl.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 141-48 for more details pertaining to the Pfizer Develop-
ment Project.
18. See Brief of the Respondents at 8, No. 04-108, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469
(2005).
19. Id.
20. Id. (alteration in original).
21. See Terry Pristin, Eminent Domain Revisited: A Minnesota Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, at
C9 (providing an excellent example of a beneficial economic taking involving the condemnation of a
single auto dealer for the construction of a $160 million Best Buy corporate headquarters in a Minnea-
polis suburb of 34,000 people. "The 1.6-million-square-foot campus, made up of four buildings shaped
like ships, was completed in 2003 and currently houses 4,500 employees. City officials say it has given
a big boost to an aging community that had been steadily losing population since the 1970's [sic]."); see
also infra text accompanying notes 162-67 (explained in detail).
22. The community gains through increased tax revenue and job opportunities, and the private
developer gains through profit realized as a result of the taking. Therefore, some of this gain should be
transferred to the innocent condemnee, who involuntarily sells his property for whatever price the
market commands, good or bad.
23. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 ("In affirming the City's authority to take petitioners' properties, we
do not minimize the hardship that condemnations may entail, notwithstanding the payment of just
compensation.").
24. See House Panel Wants to Block Funding for Eminent Domain Takings, GREENWIRE, Sept. 8,
2005 ("The fear is now in the hearts of many Americans that if the government wants your property,
they have the right to take it .... " (quoting Representative Henry Bonilla) (internal quotations omit-
ted)).
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uct of one's sweat and determination can be taken away by the government
is understandably bothersome to all private property owners. 25 Neverthe-
less, under circumstances similar to those seen in Kelo,26 private property
owners should accept that their rights will be sacrificed for the public good.
Individual private owners do not have legal interests that are superior to
those of the general public.27 However unfair or unjust it may appear on the
surface, all private property rights must yield to the public need.28 Conse-
quently, efforts to block the power of eminent domain go against the grain
of our societal framework, because such legislation seeks to deprive the
public of a tool that enables municipalities nationwide to determine what
property uses are most beneficial for their respective communities as a
whole. As a country, we need this power for future growth and develop-
ment,29 and legislation that seeks to destroy it fails to see the big picture,
which is that we are only as strong as our weakest link. Therefore, the sup-
porters of H.R. 4128 should redirect their efforts away from lobbying the
government to cut funds for economic takings, and instead focus on deter-
mining the degree to which condemnees must be compensated for their
loss, 30 because the general public interest in receiving benefits derived
25. The benefits of homeownership go beyond mere possession. See HomeSight, Benefits of
Homeownership, http://www.homesightwa.org/benefits%20of/20home%20ownership.htm (last visited
Jan. 8, 2007).
26. New London constitutionally exercised its eminent domain power to condemn fifteen homes
for the Pfizer Project, which purports to advance the general public welfare of the city. In the future,
developers will be able to cite Kelo, and municipalities will likely grant requests to exercise eminent
domain. See also Iver Peterson, As Land Goes to Revitalization, There Go the Old Neighbors, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005, at 29 ("The courts, including the Supreme Court, have generally supported [the]
argument that economic growth amounts to an overriding public benefit.").
27. The existence of the eminent domain power is a perfect illustration of how the general welfare
trumps individual rights.
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (anticipating that private property will be taken for a "public use,"
and guaranteeing just compensation for such taking); see also Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484 (interpreting "pub-
lic use" as "public purpose"); Timothy Egan, Ruling Sets Off Tug of War Over Private Property, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2005, at Al ("The initial outcry after the court case was: Nobody's house is safe, we've
got to do something now... [blut as more states take a look at this they will respond in some form, but
they won't want to take away a valuable tool." (quoting Larry Morandi, who tracks land use develop-
ments for the National Conference of State Legislatures) (internal quotations omitted)).
29. See Ronald Smothers, In Long Branch, No Olive Branches, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005 Wil-
liam Dressel, executive director of New Jersey League of Municipalities, commented on the necessity
of growth:
Given the fiscal condition of our state with its budget deficit and the absence of any lifeline
whatsoever from the federal government, towns have been encouraged to work with the pri-
vate sector ever since the redevelopment law in the state was passed in 1949 and amended in
1992 and 2003.... Where do people think development comes from? Some development
fairy who waves her magic wand?
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
30. See Brief of American Planning Association, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon-
dents, No. 04-108, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) ("Adjusting compensation awards
to provide more complete indemnification would be a far more effective reform of the existing system
of eminent domain than increasing federal judicial review of public use determinations.").
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from economic takings outweighs the private interest of property owner-
ship. 31
Any interpretation of just compensation has to be reconcilable with
the express language itself. Where a taking furthers a purely public use,
like a highway, it is "just" to give the condemned property owner the fair
market value of the property, because the owner is also receiving the direct
benefit of free access to a glorious highway. In that situation, the con-
demnee can actually see and participate in the end result of his sacrifice,
and is not made to feel like a complete outsider who is chewed up and spit
out by corporate America. On the other hand, where eminent domain is
used to facilitate a quasi-public purpose, like a Best Buy that creates job
opportunities and increased tax revenue, it is not necessarily "just" to sim-
ply give a property owner the fair market value of his property, prior to the
taking, despite the wide variety of DVDs and Plasma televisions. Best Buy
is a multi-billion-dollar enterprise that, just like Pfizer in Kelo, will surely
realize huge profits from a new retail store. Therefore, because there is a
considerable commercial benefit that will always be inextricably linked to
economic takings, it is un-"just" that a condemnee is deprived of every-
thing beyond fair market value.
This note calls for a new method of calculating "just compensation."
This new method, one that evaluates a multitude of factors in the determi-
nation of what is "just" compensation, will be referred to in this note as
"Kelo compensation." The notion of Kelo compensation encompasses the
competing rights of the public and private parties in a condemnation pro-
ceeding and attempts to reach an economically just solution. It encom-
passes the idea that where there is a public purpose, and that purpose can
only be furthered by transferring property from one set of private parties to
another, then the transaction should not result in a gross economic disparity
or, as Justice Black refers to it, a "manifest injustice. '32
Kelo is a perfect example of both. In 1990, the state of Connecticut
designated New London as a "distressed municipality" after decades of
31. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20; see also Scot Wrighton, Private Property Rights
Still Safe, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Aug. 30, 2005, at 13A ("The popular outcry against
Kelo overlooks that past abuses of eminent domain have generally been politically self-correcting. If the
people of New London felt that the City Council had abused their authority they could petition for plan
changes and/or replace the members of the City Council. They have done neither. The community
supports the project because the public value to the entire city justifies acquiring Kelo's land after she is
fairly compensated, despite her individual relocation hardship.").
32. In United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., the Court used the concept of "manifest
injustice" as the point in which it should stray from the typical measure of just compensation to coun-
teract a blatant transactional bias in favor of either the condemnee or city/developer in an eminent
domain proceeding. 339 U.S. 121, 123-24 (1950) ("The word 'just' in the Fifth Amendment evokes
ideas of 'fairness' and 'equity'....").
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economic decline. 33 In 1996, the federal government shut down the Naval
Undersea Warfare Center, located in Fort Trumbull, 34 which was an eco-
nomically crucial aspect of New London.35 After some legislative delibera-
tion,36 the city of New London determined that the Pfizer Project 37 would
serve as a perfect launching point for the rejuvenation of the Fort Trumbull
area.38 The New London Development Corporation ("NLDC"), a private
non-profit entity, was authorized by the city to execute the project. 39 The
NLDC successfully negotiated the purchase of a significant portion of the
required real estate, but as is usually the case in city development, there
were some residents who simply refused to sell.40
One of those residents, petitioner Susette Kelo, a New London resi-
dent since 1997, made "extensive improvements to her house, which she
prize[d] for its water view. ''4 1 Further, Wilhelmina Dery, another petitioner,
who was born in Fort Trumbull in 1918, and her husband Charles had lived
in their home since they were married around sixty years ago. 42 The peti-
tioners mentioned above, along with six others, all owned property that was
subject to condemnation simply by virtue of its location in the future area
of development. 43
Therefore, the interested parties in Kelo were Pfizer, the nine con-
demnees, and all other local citizens that would reap the benefits of the
Pfizer Project. 44 Pfizer stood to gain millions, if not billions, of dollars
from this transaction, and the local non-condemnee residents would likely
reap increased property values.45 As for the nine unwilling condemnees,
33. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473.
34. Id. Fort Trumbull was the specific area of New London involved in Kelo.
35. Id. The Naval Undersea Warfare Center employed over 1,500 people.
36. Id. The legislative deliberation involved a series of neighborhood meetings to educate the
public about the process.
37. Id. The project consisted of the development of a $300 million research facility for Pfizer
Pharmaceuticals.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 473-75. The NLDC was authorized to purchase property through negotiation or to
acquire property by exercising eminent domain in the city's name.
40. Id. at 475. In all, there were nine petitioners who owned fifteen properties in Fort Trumbull,
New London.
41. Id.
42. Id.; see also Peterson, supra note 26 ("On a good day, Matt Dery can see Fishers Island, off
the tip of Long Island, from his kitchen window here at the mouth of the Thames River. The view is one
thing he loves about his home, and one reason he wants to stay.").
43. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475. There was no evidence presented or any allegations that any of these
properties were blighted or otherwise in poor condition.
44. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 141-48. The benefits included tax revenues, increased
employment, and inflated property values.
45. The development of the area would attract more citizens and business enterprises, which
would have the effect of boosting the value of all of the surrounding land.
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their situation was not as fortunate. Under current law, they were stuck
with the fair market value of their property at the time of the taking as "just
compensation. '46 This is why private property owners have become en-
raged. Kelo has awoken the American public to this dilemma, and it has
emphasized the need for balance under the takings doctrine.
The purpose of this note is to remind citizens of the United States that
we cannot always have our cake and eat it too. We want to save the home-
less, prevent crime, and cure disease with the minimal possible sacrifice.
However, what may appear to be a minimal sacrifice to some is, in fact,
something entirely different to others. In other words, it is easy to say emi-
nent domain is a good tool when you are not the subject of the condemna-
tion. On the other hand, the individual interests of the homeowner or
condemnee rarely, if ever, outweigh the more general interests of an entire
town or city. Before Kelo, the balancing of these interests was more
straightforward. In a post-Kelo world, there needs to be a way to better
serve all the involved parties' interests. Consequently, under circumstances
where a large private corporation is a primary beneficiary in an eminent
domain proceeding designed with the "public purpose" of community im-
provement, fair market value alone is insufficient as just compensation to a
condemnee, because it creates a grossly disproportional economic situation
between all interested parties.
Part I of this note will discuss takings jurisprudence as it stands today,
with a special emphasis on the link between the post-Kelo deterioration of
the "public use" prong and a fresh interpretation of "just compensation."
Part II of this note will illustrate the unmistakable public benefits of eco-
nomic takings, thereby calling into question legislation that seeks to block a
state power that dates back to the inception of the Bill of Rights. Finally,
Part III of this note will reveal the core issues involved with the innocent
condemnee and will delve into possible solutions focusing on reinterpreting
just compensation to account for factors beyond fair market value.
I. TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
A. Public Purpose and the Deferential Standard
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution affords two
primary protections to private property owners.47 The first limitation on the
46. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950).
47. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation.").
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eminent domain power is that it must be used to further a "public use." 48
Over the years, however, "public use" has morphed into "public purpose,"
and the protection afforded by the clause has lost its bite.
In 1954, in Berman v. Parker, the Supreme Court decided its first case
involving a transfer from one private property owner to another through the
use of eminent domain. 49 The District of Columbia was, at the time of
Berman, not a very nice place to live. 50 Particularly, in southwest Washing-
ton, D.C., 51 surveys prepared by the National Capital Planning Commission
("NCPC") 52 revealed that "64.3% of the dwellings were beyond repair,
18.4% needed major repairs, only 17.3% were satisfactory; 57.8% of the
dwellings had outside toilets, 60.3% had no baths, 29.3% lacked electricity,
82.2% had no wash basins or laundry tubs, [and] 83.8% lacked central
heating."'53 After a public hearing, the NCPC had its plan to redevelop the
area certified for execution by the District of Columbia Redevelopment
Land Agency. 54
The "public purpose" justification in Berman was the removal of
"blight," the hazards of which were painstakingly described by Justice
Douglas. 55 The Court felt that a narrow interpretation of "public use" was
simply incompatible with the evolving needs of society. 56 Further, the
Court reasoned that determinations of circumstances requiring eminent
domain was best left to state and local legislatures, and "[t]he role of the
judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised for a public
purpose is an extremely narrow one." Therefore, Berman stands for the
proposition that the exercise of eminent domain is proper under circum-
48. Id.
49. 348 U.S. 26, 29 (1954) (involving a private developer who created a "comprehensive or
general plan" designating land for use for "housing, business, industry, recreation, education, public
buildings, public reservations, and other general categories of public and private uses of the land").
50. Id. at 28. Congress made a legislative determination that "owing to technological and socio-
logical changes, obsolete lay-out, and other factors, conditions existing in the District of Columbia with
respect to substandard housing and blighted areas, including the use of buildings in alleys as dwellings
for human habitation, are injurious to the public health, safety, morals, and welfare." id.
51. Id. at 30. This area is referred to in the opinion as "Project Area B."
52. Id. at 29. The NCPC was authorized by Congress to adopt redevelopment plans for specific
areas.
53. Id. at 30.
54. Id. at 30-31. The project creates "boundaries and allocates the use of the land for various
purposes," including low-rent housing.
55. Id. at 32 ("Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread disease
and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there to
the status of cattle. They may indeed make living an almost insufferable burden ... a blight on the
community .. " (emphasis added)).
56. Id. at 33 (stating, in dicta, that "[tihe concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary" (citation omitted)).
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stances that can be justified by a legitimate, underlying "public purpose" as
determined by local legislatures. 57
Thirty years later, the Court upheld another "taking" using the defer-
ential "public purpose" standard announced in Berman. In Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff the Court dealt with the issue of using the eminent
domain power to redistribute fee simple ownership in land. 58 The Hawaiian
Islands were originally settled around a feudal land tenure system that
placed control of all the land in the hands of the high chief.59 Beginning in
the early 1800s, efforts were unsuccessfully made to divide the lands
among the Crown, the chiefs, and the common people. 60 In the 1960s, the
Hawaii Legislature was finally awoken to this issue and determined that
while 49% of the state land was owned by Hawaii and the federal govern-
ment, another 47% was held in fee simple by only seventy-two private
landowners. 61 This led to the legislative conclusion that Hawaii's concen-
trated land ownership scheme was having the harmful effect of skewing the
state's residential fee simple market, resulting in inflated land prices and
causing injury to the "public tranquility and welfare. '62
To resolve the issue, the Hawaii Legislature designed a plan to con-
demn designated tracts of land from private fee simple owners and then re-
sell that land to a set of private citizens who had applied for fee simple
ownership. 63 The public purpose of the plan was to balance the residential
land market, thereby reducing inflation and allowing more Hawaiians to
experience the joys home ownership. In an 8-0 opinion, 64 the Court con-
cluded that the social and economic "evils" associated with land oligopoly
satisfied the "public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment. 65 Further,
the Court clearly supported the broad interpretation of "public use" set out
in Berman, and stated in dictum, "The mere fact that property taken out-
right by eminent domain is transferred in the first instance to private bene-
ficiaries does not condemn that taking as having only a private purpose. '66
57. Id. at 32-33.
58. 467 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1984).
59. Id. at 232 ("There was no private ownership of land.").
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 233-34.
64. Id. at 245. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
65. Id. at 241-42.
66. ld. at 243-44 ("It is not essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable por-
tion,... directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in order [for it] to constitute a public use."
(quoting Rindge Co. v. L.A., 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (internal quotations omitted))).
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Therefore, Midkiff emphasizes that it is the "taking's purpose, and not its
mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause. '67
With Berman and Midkiff for ammunition, the majority in Kelo had no
problem concluding, under the deferential standard of review, that boosting
the economy was a legitimate "public purpose" for using the eminent do-
main power.68 However, in an effort to preserve a limitation on the state's
power to appropriate property for a "public purpose," the Court emphasized
that "it has long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property
of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even
though A is paid just compensation. '69 This limitation is incredibly narrow
and essentially provides that one-to-one transfers between private property
owners cannot be facilitated by the eminent domain power. 70 Such a pro-
tection is merely illusory, however, because no local legislature would ever
approve of a one-to-one transfer wholly unrelated to any public benefit
whatsoever. Therefore, the Kelo holding has, in effect, eliminated the "pub-
lic use" requirement of the takings doctrine by reasserting the Midkiff hold-
ing, concluding that if the taking bears a rational, legitimate relation to the
public health, safety, and welfare, then there is nothing in the Fifth Amend-
ment that would prohibit such an exercise of eminent domain. 71 Without
any meaningful judicial review of what constitutes a "public use," the
clause can no longer function as a serious protection to private property
owners.
72
The Court in Kelo further bolstered its broad definition of "public pur-
pose" and the wide latitude given to legislatures by acknowledging that a
"government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual
private parties."'73 This recognition of private benefit illustrates the Court's
unwillingness to strike down a legislative determination of "public use,"
even where private citizens stand to greatly benefit from the taking. Ac-
cordingly, the current law is an extremely deferential approach, which es-
sentially eliminates altogether judicial involvement in "public purpose"
67. Id. at 244. Justice O'Conner also makes it clear that "if a legislature, state or federal, deter-
mines there are substantial reasons for an exercise of the taking power, courts must defer to its determi-
nation that the taking will serve a public use." Id.
68. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005).
69. Id. at 477 (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 487; see also Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245 ("A purely private taking could not withstand the
scrutiny of the public use requirement; it would serve no legitimate purpose of government and would
thus be void.").
71. Midkiff 467 U.S. at 244 ("Judicial deference is required because, in our system of govem-
ment, legislatures are better able to assess what public purposes should be advanced by an exercise of
the taking power."); see also Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
72. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488-89.
73. Id. at 485.
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determinations, and therefore calls for a new approach to adjudicating a
takings claim.74
B. Just Compensation
In addition to the "public use" safeguard against illegitimate uses of
eminent domain, the Fifth Amendment also requires that a condemnee be
given "just compensation. '75 For over a century, the Supreme Court has
struggled to formulate a workable standard for determining just compensa-
tion:
In an effort, however, to find some practical standard, the courts early
adopted, and have retained, the concept of market value. The owner has
been said to be entitled to the "value," the "market value," and the "fair
market value" of what is taken. The term "fair" hardly adds anything to
the phrase "market value," which denotes what "it fairly may be believed
that a purchaser in fair market conditions would have given," or, more
concisely, "market value fairly determined. ''76
As is apparent from the above quote, "fair market value," or as the
Court in United States v. Miller put it, "market value fairly determined,"
has been the historical jumping point for calculating just compensation in a
condemnation case. 77 This section will examine what can only be described
as the quagmire of defining what "fair market value" actually is, and will
reveal the inescapable truth that there is, in fact, no settled standard at all.
In Olson v. United States, the Court interpreted the constitutional
safeguard of just compensation to mean "no private property shall be ap-
propriated to public uses unless a full and exact equivalent for it be re-
turned to the owner."' 78 The Court ultimately reached the conclusion that
the "exact equivalent" is the "market value of the property at the time of
the taking contemporaneously paid in money."'79
74. Id. at 483 ("For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid
formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what
public needs justify the use of the takings power."); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) ("Subject
to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main
guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation ... ").
75. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating "nor shall private property be taken for a public use without
just compensation").
76. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (footnotes omitted) (citing United States v.
New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 344 (1923) ("market value"); United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 81 (1913) ("fair market value"); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548,
574 (1897) ("value"); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 408 (1878) ("market value")).
77. See id.
78. 292 U.S. 246, 254-55 (1934) (emphasis added) (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893)).
79. Id. at 255 (citing Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306 (1923)).
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The petitioners in Olson were land owners with property along the
Lake of the Woods, an area that lies in both the United States and Can-
ada.80 In 1898, a Canadian corporation 8' built and put into operation a dam
for the purposes of generating power and other various public uses.82 Dur-
ing its operation, many of the shorelands bordering the lake were flooded
without any regard for the owners' rights. 83 In 1925, the United States con-
summated a treaty with Great Britain-who at the time controlled the rele-
vant parts of Canada-which provided that the United States would be
liable for the costs of obtaining flowage easements from the shoreland
property owners injured by the dam. 84 Therefore, in 1926, in accordance
with the treaty, the federal government sought to acquire, by purchase or
condemnation, the necessary flowage easements. 85
The petitioners, falling into the condemnee category, argued that be-
cause their property had been flooded, it demonstrated a special adaptabil-
ity for reservoir purposes, thereby increasing its market value based on the
private power company demand for producing electricity in the area.86 The
trial judge, however, excluded all evidence offered by the petitioners, and
concluded that the appropriate compensation was to be the difference be-
tween the fair market value of the land before and after the easement was
imposed. 87 The Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the trial court, but it
stated in dictum that
to the extent that probable demand by prospective purchasers or con-
demnors affects market value, it is to be taken into account.
... [But e]lements affecting value that depend upon events or com-
binations of occurrences which, while within the realm of possibility, are
not fairly shown to be reasonably probable should be excluded from con-
sideration, for that would be to allow mere speculation and conjecture to
become a guide for the ascertainment of value .... 88
The reluctance of the Court to award compensation based on the
shorelands' potential use as a reservoir spawned from the remoteness of the
notion that players in the power industry would actually be competing for
80. Id. at 248.
81. The corporation was acting pursuant to an agreement with Great Britain.
82. Olson, 292 U.S. at 249.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 250.
86. Id. at 251. The petitioners' property was condemned in 1929.
87. Id. at 253. The government would only be liable if the land value had decreased as a result of
the flooding, and the jury was instructed to consider agricultural use or value as the sole criteria for
determining market value. Additionally, no loss of value was to be attributed to the unauthorized flood-
ing of the land prior to the treaty. Id. at 253-54.
88. Id. at 256-57.
[Vol 82:2
KELO COMPENSATION
these flowage rights had the government not planned to condemn them.89 If
there was any reasonable probability that the power companies would have,
or legally could have, purchased the flowage rights prior to the condemna-
tions, the Court would have likely ruled in favor of the petitioners. How-
ever, because no reasonable probability existed, the Court concluded that
"the value to be ascertained does not include, and the owner is not entitled
to compensation for any element resulting subsequently to or because of
the taking." 90
In a similar case, the Court in United States v. Miller again put the fair
market standard to the test.9 1 In 1938, the United States government was
faced with the task of creating a new right-of-way for the Central Pacific
Railroad in anticipation of the inevitable flooding of the old right-of-way. 92
As a consequence, the federal government was forced to design a plan that
involved condemning multiple privately owned properties to pave the way
for the future railroad.9 3 On December 14, 1938, the government filed a
complaint in eminent domain against the respondents to condemn the
land--consisting primarily of "uncleared brush land"-necessary for the
railroad project. 94 However, in accordance with Olson, the trial court in-
structed the jury to award as compensation the fair market value of the
property on August 26, 1937, the time at which the project was authorized
by Congress. 95 The crucial point of dispute, however, was the additional
instruction that the jury should "disregard increment of value due to the
initiation of the project and arising after August 26, 1937."96
The respondent condemnees in Miller agreed with the date of valua-
tion, but argued that no element of determining market value should be
discarded or ignored, including the anticipated value of their land based on
the condemnation project itself.97 The Court rejected this argument on the
basis that such a rule would be overinclusive:
89. Id. at 260-61. The shoreland owners had no legal means of acquiring all the rights to flow the
lands necessary for the raising of the lakes, and therefore, there was no probability of a private demand.
90. Id. at 256.
91. 317 U.S. 369, 370 (1943).
92. Id. at370-71.
93. Id. at 371. The properties were located in a settlement known as Boomtown in northern Cali-
fornia.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 372.
96. Id. at 372-73 (footnote omitted). The court of appeals reversed, but the Supreme Court, in a
footnote to the Miller opinion, stated that the appellate court erred in characterizing the ruling of the
trial judge, framing the instruction as "qualified witnesses testifying as to the value of the land on the
date of the taking must subtract from this valuation any increment in value after August 26, 1937." Id.
at 373 & n.6.
97. Id. at 374. Other properties had already been condemned, thereby increasing the market value
of the respondents' property.
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[S]trict adherence to the criterion of market value may involve inclusion
of elements which, though they affect such value, must in fairness be
eliminated in a condemnation case, as where the formula is attempted to
be applied as between an owner who may not want to part with his land
because of its special adaptability to his own use, and a taker who needs
the land because of its peculiar fitness for the taker's purposes. 98
The Court in Miller ultimately agreed with the trial court instruction
and held that where there is a public project designating specific tracts of
land to be condemned or, as in the Miller facts, a plan that marked a more
general area of prospective condemnation, none of the condemnees were
entitled to an enhanced market value based on either (1) probable increases
in value due to government activities, or (2) actual increases in value stem-
ming from already completed portions of the government project.99 The
holding was based on a rule of foreseeability, stating simply that if there is
a strong likelihood of condemnation, then no evidence as to enhanced value
arising from the condemnation plan is admissible.' 0 0 Because the respon-
dents' land in Miller was within the general area of the future railroad, the
Court held that they were not entitled to any enhanced value spawning
from the construction of the new right-of-way. 101
The Miller holding perfectly illustrates the Court's reluctance to apply
a stringent standard of assessing "just compensation." The majority ex-
pressly stated, in dictum, that certain elements of market valuation, 10 2 al-
though relevant to actual value, must for the sake of "fairness" be
disregarded by the Court. 10 3 Therefore, the Court impliedly concluded that
the application of a true market value standard would result in manifest
injustice to the public. 104 If, for instance, the Court had allowed the respon-
dents to benefit from either the anticipated increases in value or the prior
takings where it was foreseeable that their property was inevitably going to
be condemned as well, then this would have skewed the burden borne by
the public to compensate the private owners for their loss, resulting in a
windfall to the condemnee. This, of course, begs the question: What if the
condemning party is not the government or the People? Additionally, what
98. Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 376-77.
100. Id. at 377.
101. Id. at 379.
102. The elements discarded by the Miller majority are the owner's unwillingness to sell the prop-
erty, or low supply, and the government's need to use the property, high demand-two elements that
are absolutely key to determining market value in the traditional context.
103. Miller, 317 U.S. at 375.
104. See id.; see also United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950)
("[W]hen market value has been too difficult to find, or when its application would result in manifest
injustice to owner or public, courts have fashioned and applied other standards." (emphasis added)).
[Vol 82:2
KELO COMPENSATION
if the condemnation is not for a public "use," but rather, a public "pur-
pose"?
One year after Miller was decided, the Court dealt with another case
involving a government condemnation for a public "use" in United States
v. Commodities Trading Corp., and again acknowledged the flexibility of
the fair market value standard. 105 In 1944,106 the United States War De-
partment requisitioned about 760,000 pounds of whole black pepper as a
"necessit[y] of [the] wartime economy" from a private owner, Commodi-
ties Trading Corporation ("Commodities"), through the use of eminent
domain. 107 It is important to note that Commodities was not a trader in
pepper, but rather an investor in pepper, and at the time of condemnation it
had held a stock of about 17,000,000 pounds of pepper in anticipation of a
significant rise in the price, at which time it was expecting to sell it.108 The
government argued that just compensation should have been 6.63 cents per
pound, the OPA ceiling price 109 of pepper at the time of condemnation." 10
Commodities claimed that they were entitled to 22 cents per pound, argu-
ing, among other things, that Congress could not constitutionally fix the
ceiling price as the measure for determining just compensation in a con-
demnation case."I 1 In striking a compromise, the lower court came up with
a fixed price of 15 cents per pound, using a multi-factor test to make its
final determination. 112 This compromise and test, however, were ultimately
reversed by the Supreme Court. 113
105. 339 U.S. 121.
106. This case was decided during WWII.
107. Commodities, 339 U.S. at 122, 125.
108. Commodities Trading Corp. v. United States (Commodities 1), 83 F. Supp. 356, 357 (Ct. Cl.
1949).
109. The Office of Price Administration, a United States federal agency in World War II, was
established to minimize wartime inflation. THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2005), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/65/of/OfficePr.html. In order to achieve its goal, the OPA set ceiling prices on
all commodities. Id.
110. Commodities, 339 U.S. at 122.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 122-23. The factors weighed by the lower court were (1) the "retention value" or price
Commodities could have secured for its pepper had it been permitted to sell it after the government
restrictions on pepper were lifted, (2) the original acquisition costs of Commodities for the pepper, (3)
the prices at which Commodities sold pepper after the government condemnation, (4) subsequent OPA
ceiling prices, and (5) the average price of pepper for the past seventy-five years. Id. at 123; see also
Commodities 1, 83 F. Supp. at 357 (stating that the first factor, "retention value," referred to wartime
conditions, where the government has the undisputed right to say to the citizen, "if you want to sell your
property you must not sell it for more than a certain price," but the government cannot condemn the
property and then award this fixed price as just compensation unless that price reflects the condemnee's
right to hold his property until he can obtain the price a willing buyer would pay).
113. Commodities, 339 U.S. at 131.
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The Court began its analysis with an overview of how just compensa-
tion is typically treated by the judiciary, stating that "when market value
has been too difficult to find, or when its application would result in mani-
fest injustice to owner or public, courts have fashioned and applied other
standards."' 14 This dictum clearly supports the inference that the Court is
willing to be flexible when it comes to calculating "just" compensation,
and additionally lends credence to a theory that given the right set of cir-
cumstances-perhaps similar to those seen in Kelo-the Court may actu-
ally find a "manifest injustice" to the owner, rather than the public. This
was not the case in Commodities Trading, however, because shortly after
its brief overview, the Court concluded, in favor of the government and
contrary to the lower court, that the OPA ceiling price at the time of the
taking was sufficiently "just" compensation given the wartime condi-
tions. 115 In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court reasoned that
because (1) OPA ceiling prices were fashioned with similar standards of
"fairness" and "equity," (2) commodities could only be sold at or below the
ceiling prices, and (3) most businesses either dealing in perishable goods or
dependent on continuous sales were forced to sell at the ceiling prices,
those prices "represented not only market value but in fact the only value
that could be realized by most owners."1 16 Additionally, the Court con-
cluded that if "just" compensation awards were to generally exceed ceiling
prices, entrepreneurial owners may see it as an opportunity to withhold
essential wartime materials until condemnation, thereby frustrating the
public objective that justified the taking in the first place. 117
The Court, however, did provide an exception, placing the burden on
Commodities to prove "special conditions and hardships peculiarly appli-
cable to it" that could potentially adjust the award in its favor. 118 Com-
modities' strongest arguments were (1) that the prices paid by
Commodities to originally acquire the condemned pepper exceeded those
of the ceiling price, and (2) its status as an "investor" in pepper, rather than
a "trader," entitled it to, as the lower court referred to it, "retention value"
in the pepper.1 19 The majority rejected both arguments. The first argument
114. Id. at 123 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); Olson v.
United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934)).
115. Id. at 125.
116. Id. at 124 (emphasis added). The Court also reasoned that many commodities were perishable
and many businesses relied on continuous sales, thereby forcing many businesses to sell at the estab-
lished OPA ceiling prices. This reasoning, despite the facts that pepper is not perishable and Commodi-
ties did not depend on continuous sales, applied in order to avoid an equal protection issue.
117. Id. at 125.
118. Id. at 128.
119. Id. at 128-29; see supra note 112 (explaining the term "retention value").
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was rejected on the grounds that the original price paid for the pepper was
irrelevant, because economic losses or gains realized by the condemnee as
a result of the taking are never factored into just compensation determina-
tions. 120 The Court also concluded that Commodities had no right to "reten-
tion value," pointing to numerous other businesses that lost anticipated
profits as a result of price controls or condemnation, 12 1 and declared that
"[s]acrifices of this kind and others far greater are the lot of a people en-
gaged in war." 122 The majority quickly acknowledged, however, that al-
though wartime justified the losses, it did not legitimize imposing an
"unfair and disproportionate burden" upon Commodities. 123 But in the next
breath, the Court held that no such burden or "special conditions and hard-
ships" were proven in this case. 124 The Court then rejected the remainder of
Commodities' arguments and reversed the lower court. 125
To summarize, all three of the above cases involved a purely public
"use," the government always prevailed, and the Court was always hesitant
about devising a universal just compensation standard that would apply to
every condemnation. Additionally, there are two rules that can be ex-
tracted: (1) Fair market value or "market value fairly determined" is the
value of the property at the time the taking is contemplated, or if contempo-
raneous with the taking itself, at the time the property is taken. (2) Con-
demnees are not entitled to any enhanced value attributable to the
government project itself if there is, from the time of contemplation, a
strong likelihood or probability that their property is going to be taken to
further the project. The time of valuation rule is ironclad, but the enhanced
value rule, if viewed in light of the Commodities holding, can be seen as a
rule to avoid "manifest injustice" to the government or the People. 126 If,
120. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) ("It may be more or less than the owner's
investment. He may have acquired the property for less than its worth or he may have paid a speculative
and exorbitant price. Its value may have changed substantially while held by him. The return yielded
may have been greater or less than interest, taxes and other carrying charges. The public may not by any
means confiscate the benefits, or be required to bear the burden, of the owner's bargain.").
121. Justice Jackson, in dissent, articulated stronger grounds for rejecting Commodities' "retention
value" argument. Commodities, 339 U.S. at 139-40 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The Emergency Price
Control Act provided that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to require any person to sell any
commodity." Id. Therefore, according to Justice Jackson, the majority was confusing the separate issues
of price fixing and condemnation, thereby applying the right of retention in a free market to a forced
sale, where no such right ever exists. Id. at 140-41.
122. Id. at 129 (majority opinion).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 129-31.
126. Id. at 123. In the context of condemnation, the "government," which at times feels like an
entirely separate entity, morphs into the "People" given the public nature of the proceeding. This psyche
carries over into the decisions of the Supreme Court. However, when you substitute a private corpora-
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however, the primary beneficiary of the project is not the People, but rather
a private corporation like Pfizer or Best Buy, such a rule may be interpreted
to avoid "manifest injustice" to the owner condemnee. In other words, in a
situation where a private corporation will profit from a condemnation-
justified by collateral benefits to the local economy-the condemnee is
suffering an "unfair and disproportionate" burden. 127
Olson, in dictum, stated that elements affecting property value that are
"reasonably probable" should be taken into the consideration of "just com-
pensation."' 28 Using the Kelo facts as an illustration, Pfizer announced that
it was going to build a $300 million research facility in February 1998, but
the New London city council did not authorize the NLDC to acquire prop-
erty by eminent domain until January 2000, almost two full years later.129
Therefore, with Olson and Miller as support, it can be argued that between
the time Pfizer announced its new facility and the authorization of eminent
domain, 130 it was "reasonably probable" that the demand for the con-
demnees' property increased in anticipation of the Pfizer Project, thereby
boosting its value. Consequently, those condemnees are theoretically enti-
tled to the anticipation value of their property prior to contemplation of the
taking.
Further, in dictum in Miller, the Court states that "strict adherence to
the criterion of market value may involve inclusion of elements which,
though they affect such value, must in fairness be eliminated in a condem-
nation case." 131 In Miller, those elements of value were the condemnees'
unwillingness to sell, or low supply, and the People's need for a railroad, or
high demand. 132 Those elements will always be present in a condemnation
proceeding, but under circumstances where a corporation is the demanding
entity, not the government, then perhaps those elements "must in fairness"
be taken into account.
tion in place of the "People," it has the immediate effect of lessening the public burden, thereby opening
windows of opportunity for the condemnee.
127. Id. at 129.
128. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 256-57 ("[T]o the extent that probable demand by
prospective purchasers or condemnors affects market value, it is to be taken into account. .... [but
e]lements affecting value that depend upon events or combinations of occurrences which, while within
the realm of possibility, are not fairly shown to be reasonably probable should be excluded from con-
sideration for that would be to allow mere speculation and conjecture to become a guide for the ascer-
tainment of value ....").
129. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473-75 (2005).
130. Miller treated the time of contemplation as the time the treaty gave authority to the United
States to use eminent domain. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 372 (1943).
131. Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
132. Id.
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Commodities, which can be described as indecisive at best, is the icing
on the condemnee cake. After the Court rejected the multi-factor calcula-
tion scheme designed by the lower court, it reasoned that the OPA ceiling
price, established by the government condemnor, was an appropriate "fair
market" price to be paid as just compensation. 133 After reaching that con-
clusion, however, the Court appeared to second-guess itself by allowing
Commodities to prove that it suffered an "unfair and disproportionate bur-
den." 134 Therefore, the Court expressed a willingness to look beyond fair
market value, which it determined in Commodities to be the ceiling price,
and take into consideration hardships of the condemnee. 135 Certainly, in a
situation similar to Kelo, it can be said that the condemnee is suffering an
"unfair and disproportionate burden" for the good of the community. 136
Why does the private corporation involved in the taking not share in this
burden?
In the next section, I will illustrate the myriad benefits of economic
takings, which will, consequently, stress the necessity of a more balanced
method for determining just compensation in condemnation cases.
II. SOCIOECONOMIC VALUE OF ECONOMIC TAKINGS
The power of eminent domain is a "vitally important tool" for a grow-
ing and ever-changing society. 137 "Assembling land for redevelopment
helps revitalize local economies, create much-needed jobs, and generate
revenues that enable cities to provide essential services." 138 Further, legis-
lation that seeks to prevent all exercises in eminent domain that involve a
transfer among private parties 39 has the possibility of hampering commu-
nity development in an era of tremendous economic growth. 140
133. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 128, 131 (1950).
134. Id. at 129.
135. Id. at 128.
136. Cf id. at 128-29.
137. David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Make Eminent Domain Fair for All, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
12, 2005, at A17.
138. See Int'l Econ. Dev. Council, Eminent Domain, http://www.iedconline.org/
?p=EminentDomain (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) ("essential services" refer to police, fire, school, water,
etc.); see also Terry Pristin, Connecticut Homeowners Say Eminent Domain Isn't a Revenue-Raising
Device, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2004, at C8 ("New London city authorities said the condemnations were
justified because the city, one of Connecticut's poorest, had endured three decades of economic decline,
including the recent loss of 1,900 government jobs, and had few options for increasing its tax base to
help pay for schools and services. After officials persuaded Pfizer, the drug company, to open a $270
million research building on the site of a former linoleum plant, the adjacent Fort Trumbull neighbor-
hood seemed ideally suited to attract additional investment .....
139, H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005).
140. See Int'l Econ. Dev. Council, supra note 138 ("[Anti-economic development] bills are job-
killing pieces of legislation.").
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In Kelo, the projected benefits of the economic development project
were far-reaching. 141 The "carefully considered" plan was anticipated to
generate upwards of $1 million in tax revenues, over a thousand jobs, and
various improvements to the streets, sewers, and overall environmental
conditions of the area. 142 In addition to the future potential benefits men-
tioned above, the first phase of the plan, which utilized the uncontested
parcels, was actually completed in 2001.143 The completed phase, high-
lighted by $12 million of infrastructure for the Pfizer facility, was accom-
panied by "street improvements.., new water, sewer and underground
utility lines; new sidewalks and streetlights; and an extensive landscaping
program with new tree plantings to screen out the upgraded regional
wastewater treatment facility." 144 The wastewater treatment facility, which
was a major concern of the project, has already taken vast strides in reduc-
ing odors and improving aesthetic aspects of the surrounding landscape. 145
Additionally, a river walkway, which will be able to accommodate both
pedestrian and bicycle traffic, is being constructed along the entire length
of the area's waterfront. 146 The final phases are currently underway, and
they will include the construction of a conference center, hotel, and
residential housing. 147 Although all of the benefits that motivated the plan
are not guaranteed to accrue, the plan has already cleaned up the city in a
variety of ways, and if they do come to fruition, it is undeniable that the
City of New London will be drastically improved. 148
There are multiple examples of economic takings that have proven to
be beneficial to entire communities. In 2000, Canton, Mississippi, was
chosen as the home for a new manufacturing plant of the Nissan Motor
Company. 149 The State of Mississippi was inspired by a Mercedes-Benz
factory that was built in neighboring Alabama, which had the effect of
creating and facilitating, directly and indirectly, 83,000 jobs. 150 In Novem-
ber 2000, the Mississippi Development Authority ("MDA") began acquir-
ing approximately 1,400 needed acres for the 2.5 million square foot
141. See Brief of the Respondents, supra note 18, at 8.
142. Id.
143. See INT'L ECON. DEV. COUNCIL, EMINENT DOMAIN RESOURCE KIT 18, available at
http://www.iedconline.org/Downloads/EminentDomainKit.pdf
144. Id. at 18.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 18-19.
147. Id. at 19.
148. See id. at 16-19.
149. Id. at 20. Nissan promised over 4,000 jobs.
150. Id.
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plant. 151 By August 2001, the MDA had successfully negotiated sales of
the majority of needed parcels, and it was able to acquire the rest through
the use of eminent domain. 152
Production at the Nissan plant began on May 27, 2003, and "[s]ince
then, Nissan has not only brought the promised jobs to Canton 5 3; it has
also invested in the community itself.' 154 Contributions from Nissan have
included "$100,000 to Boys and Girls Clubs, four full scholarships to area
high school seniors, and a pledge of $150,000 (over five years) to a consor-
tium of Mississippi colleges."' 155 Further, it is estimated that by 2010, there
will be a total of 31,683 direct and indirect jobs as a result of Nissan and
personal income taxes, estimated to reach nearly $700 million, will signifi-
cantly contribute to the $1.1 billion the state is expected to receive in reve-
nues. 156
Another example occurred in Topeka, Kansas, where the Target Cor-
poration decided to locate its new distribution center. 157 GO Topeka, the
economic development commission of the Topeka Chamber of Commerce,
acquired nine of the twelve needed parcels of real property for the site, but
there was private opposition to the sale of the remaining parcels. 158 GO
Topeka ultimately prevailed in the Supreme Court of Kansas over two un-
willing private property owners and condemned the remaining parcels us-
ing the eminent domain power. 159 Target signed a fifteen-year agreement
promising to employ at least 650 people for ten years, 160 and in June 2004,
the Target center opened and hired 600 employees with the expectation of
adding 400 more within 3 years. 161
Additionally, the eminent domain power was used in Richfield, Min-
nesota, a suburb of Minneapolis, to acquire land for the creation of a Best
Buy headquarters.162 Best Buy began acquiring property in 2001, a process
151. Id.
152. Id. at 21.
153. Id. Nissan promised over 4,000 jobs, and it ended up directly creating 5,300 jobs.
154. Id.
155. Id. Additionally, in 2005, Nissan made a payment in lieu of taxes of approximately $1.5
million to the Canton School District.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 23.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 24.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 25.
162. Id. at 26; see also Pristin, supra note 21 ("Though there was loud opposition to the project
from employees of the holdout property owner, Walser Auto Sales, and others who feared its effect on
traffic, much of the community supported it. After a campaign in which redevelopment was a central
issue, the mayor, Martin Kirsch, was re-elected in 2002 by a wide margin.").
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that was "facilitated by the fact that many residents felt the neighborhood
had been deteriorating because homeowners had been unwilling to make
repairs in the face of proposed development." 163 However, as is typically
the case, there was private opposition to the Best Buy headquarters. 164 Af-
ter court-ordered mediation, Best Buy agreed to pay one private objector
$8.7 million in addition to the compensation given at the time of the initial
taking, and Best Buy then officially relocated to the planned site on March
31, 2003.165 Prior to the Best Buy project, the development area generated
about $700,000 in annual property taxes. 166 In 2005, only two years after
Best Buy relocated, the property tax revenue more than quadrupled, reach-
ing approximately $3.2 million. 167
Eminent domain was also used to completely restructure the commer-
cial and social center of the city of Lakewood, Colorado. 168 In 1966, the
Villa Italia Mall was constructed, and for thirty years it prevailed as the
largest indoor shopping mall between Chicago and the west coast, offering
1.4 million square feet of commercial space. 169 However, in the early
1990s, the mall took a turn for the worst. 170 Between the years of 1994 and
2000, revenues dropped roughly $1.2 million. 171 By 2001, its anchor de-
partment stores, J.C. Penney and Montgomery Ward, closed down. 172
The city of Lakewood decided to take action, and throughout the
course of a year, it underwent an in-depth public process, involving all
interested parties within the community in its decision to revitalize the
area.173 Through this process, and the aid of a private development firm, 174
163. INT'L ECON. DEV. COUNCIL, supra note 143, at 26-27.
164. Id. at 27. Walser Automotive Group owned two car dealerships totaling seven acres of the
needed parcels, and it refused to sell. See generally Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. v. Walser Auto
Sales, Inc., 630 N.W.2d 662 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). After court-ordered mediation, Best Buy agreed to
pay Walser an additional $8.7 million on top of the $9.45 million paid upon the initial taking, thereby
bolstering my theory that Kelo compensation is a very plausible option in the context of economic
development takings.
165. INT'L ECON. DEV. COUNCIL, supra note 143, at 27; see also Pristin, supra note 21 ("Some of
the displaced homeowners, including Michael and Cindy Triggs, who said they received $24,000 above
their house's market value, agreed that the redevelopment was in the best interests of Richfield. They
said it also benefited the metropolitan area by moving thousands of employees from scattered suburban
offices to a more central location within reach of bus transportation.").
166. INT'L ECON. DEV. COUNCIL, supra note 143, at 27.
167. Id. at 26-27. This was nearly a twenty-two percent increase.
168. Id. at 28.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. The public process included "establishing a citizens advisory committee and inviting
members of the community to comment on potential redevelopment options."
174. Id. The firm was Denver-based Continuum Partners, LLC.
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the city was able to ascertain a sense of what the community desired. It
ultimately settled on a town center, Belmar, "covering 22 city blocks, com-
prising 175 stores (45 to start), 1,300 residential units, a 16-screen cineplex,
a grocery store, 900,000 square feet of Class A office space, nine acres of
open space, and 9,000 parking spaces (free garage and surface)."' 175 The
estimated cost of development was $750 million. 176
Continuum Partners, the private development company employed by
the city to reconstruct the area, began to acquire land, which necessarily
entailed the exercise of eminent domain. 177 The primary challenge to de-
velopment came from a single business, Foley's, which objected because
its rent was going to increase to support the new development. 178 After
nine months of failed negotiations and litigation in court, the city and Con-
tinuum eventually prevailed. 179
The first phase of development, comprised of "two parking garages,
600,000 square feet of retail, 200,000 square feet of office space, 154 row
houses, and 100 apartments" was complete in May 2004.180 The remaining
development is expected to open sometime in 2007.181
Aesthetically pleasing building facades, designed to "enliven the
street," were composed of brick, pre-cast concrete, glass, and steel. 182 Ad-
ditionally, the entire city center is environmentally friendly, which is ex-
emplified by its use of seventy percent recycled materials from the original
site, and an "urban wind farm" powered lighting system in one of the park-
ing lots. 183 In the continuing phases of development, a 2.1-acre urban-
square park and a 1.1-acre plaza with a pond/winter skating rink will be
constructed. 184 The Belmar development has really brought the entire
community together, and it will continue to function "as the premier urban
destination for the Denver Metro west side."' 185
Further, economic takings have been used to benefit a plethora of in-
ner-city distressed communities. 186 City Heights, an "ethnically diverse
community," was in the early 1990s considered the "most blighted and
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 29.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 30.
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distressed neighborhood in San Diego."'187 Moreover, there was only one
single supermarket providing groceries for the entire community, consist-
ing of approximately 80,000 "low-to-moderate income residents."'1 88 In
2001, the City Heights Urban Retail Village ("URV") was developed to
serve the "overall retail needs of the community" and, specifically, "to
address residents' desire for better grocery options."' 189 Again, eminent
domain was necessary to acquire enough land to satisfy the demands of the
project. 190 Upon the opening of the URV, the 110,000-square-foot shop-
ping center 91 contained a 67,000-square-foot full-service supermarket,
neighboring service retail stores, 192 and various convenience retail
stores. 193 In addition, the URV provided over 200 full- and part-time jobs
and has encouraged new development in the surrounding area. 194
As the above examples illustrate, the power of eminent domain is cru-
cial to struggling economies nationwide, and stripping local municipalities
of this power can be equivocated with taking away thousands of jobs. So
why has Congress even considered this proposal? Aside from the constitu-
tional guarantees provided by the Fifth Amendment to "life, liberty, and
property," human nature affixes a very special meaning to "property." John
Locke's comments on the "state of nature" still ring true today:
Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore
I have digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with
others, become my property, without the assignation or consent of any-
body. The labour that was mine, removing them out of that common
state they were in, hath fixed my property in them. 195
Where the power of eminent domain is used, there will always be op-
position from private property owners, and with good reason. The home-
owners in Kelo spent many years making their property in New London
their home; the business owner in the Colorado example was legitimately
concerned about the future of his department stores; and the car salesman
in Minnesota did not want to lose his dealerships. 196 Almost every person
187. Id.
188. Id. The supermarket was only 25,000 square feet.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. The shopping center was "nearly 100% leased."
192. Id. These included Blockbuster, a health care facility, and Washington Mutual.
193. Id. These included a nail salon, McDonald's, and Subway.
194. Id. at 30-31 ("[A]fter the project opened, a privately sponsored mixed-use project including
385,000 square feet of housing and office space was launched at a site across the street from the cen-
ter.").
195. JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Civil Government, in 5 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE: Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 105, 117 (1823).
196. INT'L ECON. DEV. COUNCIL, supra notes 143.
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owns something, be it a house or a pair of lucky socks, and it is therefore
easy to empathize with the condemnees in the above example. However, if
giving up that pair of lucky socks would somehow help to cure the ills of
society, such as poverty and unemployment, then surely the socks must be
surrendered. But what is fair compensation for a pair of lucky socks?
III. KELO COMPENSATION
A. Unjust Compensation
Despite the proven benefits of economic takings, there still remains
the issue of resolving how much compensation is "just" as required by the
Fifth Amendment. There is an inherent flaw in a system that simply awards
fair market value to a property owner who is forced to give up property at
the hand of the government-especially when the People are only collateral
beneficiaries-and that flaw has become one of the major landowner con-
cerns nationwide. 197
The primary counterargument to awarding an amount that exceeds fair
market value is simple: the government cannot afford it.198 But big money
private corporations, like Pfizer, can afford to foot the bill. 199 For example,
in 2005, Pfizer posted a net income of $2.73 billion, which was just below
its 2004 level of $2.83 billion.200 With private corporations putting up these
incredibly high profit margins, it is inexcusable that private condemnees
receive none of the benefit when eminent domain is the tool used by these
corporations to acquire their property. After all, but for the condemnation,
these big development companies or corporations would be literally
stopped in their tracks. In an article written by Elizabeth Anderson, a phi-
losophy professor at the University of Michigan, she advances a theory of
197. See Bob Lewis, Letters from Readers, Multiplied Value, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 24,
2005, at C22 ("The editorial 'Good Riddance' (Nov. 18) defines an appropriate range for the use of
eminent domain. We must be very careful not to throw out the baby with the bath water when there are
severe blight questions. Let me suggest an added stipulation: The Fifth Amendment requires 'just
compensation' in taking property, usually interpreted as fair market value. Why not define just compen-
sation as some multiple of fair market value in private redevelopment situations-such as three or four
times. That would help assure that eminent domain is used only when absolutely necessary.").
198. See Sean Connolly, Op-Ed., A Public Purpose and a Public Benefit, BOSTON GLOBE, July 10,
2005, at El2 ("Anytime there is a physical taking of private property for public use (with extraordinary
exceptions for war, natural disasters, etc.), fair market value must be given to the property owner by the
government. Governments simply do not have the money to injudiciously exercise their powers of
eminent domain.").
199. See Pfizer Comes out Ahead by Beating Low Expectations, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 20, 2006, at 4
(stating that Pfizer is the world's largest drug maker).
200. Id.
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just compensation reform, which will be expanded upon below. 20 1 Profes-
sor Anderson's theory is predicated upon the notion that the economic de-
velopment project will succeed, thereby raising property values in the
community. 202
Professor Anderson's theory proposes that a private property owner
should receive the greater of (a) the fair market value of the property plus
any additional, reasonable moving costs, or (b) the fair market value of
similarly situated property in the community subsequent to the implementa-
tion of the economic development plan.203 Under this theory, she balances
the benefit of increased property value of surrounding neighbors whose
property was not condemned and insures that condemnees are able to enjoy
an equivalent benefit. 20 4 Option (b), therefore, would give condemnees the
ability to purchase property located in a nearby area, thereby alleviating
many of the intangible concerns associated with a sense of "community."
Additionally, option (a) gives insurance to the condemnee if the project
fails, so they will not come out as "net economic losers" as a result of the
taking.205 Using the Kelo facts as an illustration, option (b) would allow the
petitioner condemnees to receive the projected fair market value of simi-
larly situated homes after completion of the Pfizer Project, as opposed to
giving them the fair market value of the home before the project has com-
menced, which is the law as it stands.206 This option would certainly
lighten the financial blow to the Kelos, while at the same time allowing
them to remain in New London.207 Under the current law, it is likely that
the Kelos will have to relocate to an entirely different location, a place they
may never be able to call home.
B. Balancing the Private Right and Public Need
Just compensation jurisprudence has always sought to balance the pri-
vate right and the public need.208 Under current law, developers are given
an upper hand in bargaining with potential condemnees; either sell for mar-
201. See Elizabeth Anderson, On Kelo: Barking up the Wrong Tree, LEFT2RIGHT, Jan. 14, 2006,
http://left2right.typepad.com/main/2006/01/onkelobarking.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2007) ("It is
evident that the current rule of compensation, which supposedly offers property owners 'fair market
value' for their property, is a cruel joke, leaving those whose property is taken net losers.").
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
207. This theory can be applied to all future condemnees where there is an economic taking.
208. See Barron & Frug, supra note 137.
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ket value prior to the taking or be forced to sell through eminent domain
proceedings. 209 This is "manifest injustice. ' 210 The counterargument to a
bright line enhanced market value standard is the clever seller who waits
until condemnation proceedings to insure a better deal. Either way, an un-
willing seller is entitled to an enhanced value, 211 an amount that takes into
account all factors present at the time of the taking, including but not lim-
ited to, factors associated with a sense of "home," the amount of private
corporate benefit involved, and the potential value of the property as a re-
sult of the taking.212 As an amicus brief in favor of the City of New London
in Kelo conceded, the current standard occasionally fails to provide an ade-
quate amount of compensation to owners whose property is taken through
eminent domain. 213 Further, the brief continued to express that the "most
obvious shortfall is the subjective value that individual owners attach to
their properties. ' 214 The brief articulates a variety of sources that contribute
to subjective value of property, including improvements to the property
specifically tailored to the needs and preferences of the property owner,
friendships and other relationships they have formed in the community, and
the general sense of security that flows from living in familiar surround-
ings. 215 The brief specifically admits that "[t]hese values are ignored under
the fair market value test."'216 Moreover, the brief details additional, conse-
quential damages caused by the condemnation, including reasonable mov-
ing expenses, attorneys' fees, loss or damage to personal property, and in
the case of a business, the loss of goodwill. 217 These additional expenses
are excluded from the current just compensation formula as well. 218 Taken
in the aggregate, the brief makes the argument that these "systematic short-
209. This is what happened in Kelo and many other cases. Private developers will first seek to
purchase needed property at market price from an owner, but often they fail. Then, the developers will
approach the city and propose a "carefully considered" plan justifying the use of eminent domain. Upon
approval, the property is "taken" and "just compensation" of fair market value is awarded to the owner.
210. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123. Justice Black articulated
"manifest injustice" as reason for deviating from the fair market value standard.
211. See, e.g., Marc Ferris, A Heated Dispute in Newark, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2004. John In-
glesino, a lawyer who represents developers, supports increased compensation: "We will offer existing
businesses compensation above and beyond what the law requires.... We want them to be part of the
project and welcome the opportunity to incorporate them into our plan as long as it makes sense." Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
212. See Brief of the American Planning Association et al., supra note 30, at 27.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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falls in compensation help account for the intensity of opposition many
homeowners express even to compensated takings. '2
19
In United States v. Miller, Justice Roberts articulated the unusual
character of eminent domain.22 0 He explained that in a typical situation,
fair market value is "what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing
seller."'22 1 Justice Roberts then went on to describe the awkward situation
created by a condemnation proceeding: a forced property exchange be-
tween an unwilling seller and a committed buyer.22 2 The Court acknowl-
edged that ascertaining "fair" market value under these circumstances
"involves, at best, a guess by informed persons. '223 Despite this backward
bargain, the Court concluded that the difficulty of assessing property value
in light of the circumstances presented must preclude factors such as un-
willingness and need from the just compensation determination. 224
The decision to preclude such factors in Miller was made under cir-
cumstances where the property was being condemned solely for the benefit
of the "public." The factors that were discarded by the Miller majority,
unwillingness and need, should be revitalized in the wake of Kelo where
there is an economic taking. The seller is just as unwilling, but the project
no longer results solely in a "public" benefit; the economic opportunity
created for the non-government condemnor demands an alternative inter-
pretation of "just compensation."
In light of the substantial profits that will be earned by a private com-
pany or corporation 225 involved in the taking, market value alone is no
longer sufficient. The courts should consider multiple factors, including but
not limited to fair market value, in their determinations of just compensa-
tion for an involuntary loss of property.
First, courts or state legislatures must address the bargaining problem
for the condemnee that will inevitably arise in a situation where a private
corporation acquirer is given a fall-back remedy of invoking eminent do-
main powers to acquire property. A study conducted by the Missouri Emi-
nent Domain Task Force ("Task Force") concluded in its recommendations
that private buyers should be required to negotiate in good faith prior to the
219. Id. at 28.
220. See 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1943).
221. Id. at 374.
222. Id. at 375.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 473 (2005). Pfizer is the acquiring corporation.
[Vol 82:2
KELO COMPENSATION
entry of an order for condemnation. 226 Suggested factors of determining
whether such good faith negotiations have occurred include, but are not
limited to (1) proper and timely notice to the landowner that condemnation
proceedings may occur in the future; (2) an initial offer not lower than the
fair market value of the property, determined by a certified appraiser; (3) an
opportunity for the landowner to obtain an appraisal from a certified ap-
praiser of his or her choice at the condemning authority's reasonable ex-
pense; and (4) an offer of mediation from the condemning authority to the
landowner prior to condemnation. 227 Requiring these initial good faith
negotiations will likely result in better deals for the landowner, creating a
situation where eminent domain may not even be necessary, saving the
municipality time and money. Further, the Task Force recommended that a
final offer be submitted to the landowner, in writing, as well as with a rea-
sonable amount of time for review of the offer prior to condemnation pro-
ceedings. 228 Moreover, a corollary to the good faith requirement should be
the ability of courts to have discretion to penalize a condemning authority
if bad faith is shown. 229 This penalty would assure that landowners take
seriously the negotiations prior to condemnation, thereby acting to balance
out discrepancies in bargaining power.
Second, the determination of fair market value should not be limited
to the price a willing seller would sell to a willing buyer prior to the tak-
ing.230 But rather, in an economic taking context, the determination of fair
market value should also take into account future private corporation prof-
its that will accrue from the condemnation. 231 In Fort Trumball, for exam-
ple, property values are surely going to increase as a result of the new
construction, 232 and the victims of eminent domain are entitled to some of
that benefit. After all, neighbors in the area who were not forced to give up
their homes are surely going to profit from the transaction, so the con-
demnees should profit as well.
Third, additional factors that contribute to making the owner "whole"
as a result of the taking should be considered as well. Thomas A. Merrill, a
professor at Columbia Law School, suggested two methods of compensa-
226. Mo. EMINENT DOMAIN TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (2005),
available at http://www.mo.gov/mo/eminentdomain/finalrpt.pdf
227. Id.
228. Id. at 13 (suggesting thirty days as a reasonable time prior to condemnation).
229. Id. at 18. This penalty could take the form of additional costs, such as reasonable attorney fees,
expenses, or punitive damages.
230. This is the typical way of determining fair market value.
231. MO. EMINENT DOMAIN TASK FORCE, supra note 226, at 16.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 141-48.
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tion reform in his testimony before the United States Senate Committee on
the Judiciary. 233 Professor Merrill's first compensation strategy is based on
the tort theory of indemnification, which seeks "to provide more complete
recovery of losses, analogous to allowing recovery for pain and suffering in
addition to out of pocket losses. '234 His second suggestion is based off
restitution theory, which would require the "condemning authority to dis-
gorge or at least share with the condemnee the ... gains realized through
the exercise of eminent domain. '235 As Professor Merrill averred, either of
these strategies would not only lighten the burden on the condemnees, but
it would likely cut down the arbitrary use of eminent domain by increasing
the costs of condemning property.236
Additionally, as noted in the Task Force's study, condemnees are of-
ten not even provided with relocation costs. 237 The Task Force suggests
that Missouri238 should follow the lead of the federal Uniform Relocation
Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 ("Act"),
which mandates that where a project undertaken by a "displacing agency"
will result in the displacement of any person, then "actual reasonable ex-
penses in moving himself, his family, business, farm operation, or other
personal property" shall be provided to the condemnee. 239 Further, the Act
states that if the condemnation involves a home where the condemnee actu-
ally lives, then an additional payment shall be made to the condemnee.240
This payment, however, is not to exceed $22,500, which in many cases,
may be insufficient. 241
Moreover, other factors, such as "heritage value" should be taken into
consideration when making a landowner whole. 242 These factors could
include the length of time a condemnee has owned the property, how long
the property has been owned by the same family, relationships with sur-
233. See The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property, Hearing
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
printjtestimony.cfn?id=l 612&witid=466 I.
234. Id. at 116.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Mo. EMINENT DOMAIN TASK FORCE, supra note 226, at 16.
238. A detailed summary of state compensation law is beyond the scope of this note, but this is a
great idea for all states not currently providing relocation costs.
239. Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4622(a)(1) (2006).
240. Id. § 4623(a)(1).
241. Id. The statute authorizes a maximum of $22,500.
242. MO. EMINENT DOMAIN TASK FORCE, supra note 226, at 16. The report states that some mem-
bers of the Task Force were hesitant about this factor due to its inherent ambiguity, but suggested that it
is capable of definition.
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rounding neighbors, and general ties to the community. 243 Although these
factors are abstract in nature and therefore difficult to quantify, they pro-
vide further justification for an enhanced value of property.
There are various methods of determining what "just" compensation
would entail under circumstances similar to Kelo. 244 The realistic option
would be to give the homeowner an enhanced market value of his property
calculated by the anticipated value as a result of the taking.245 Another, less
optimistic idea would be to give the homeowner a certain percentage of
profit-share in the private corporation. 246
Under either option stated above, or any other option available, the
primary purpose of the enhanced compensation would be to reasonably
offset the gross disparity in economic benefit resulting from the taking. 247
CONCLUSION
People are obviously going to object to a condemnation of their home
or property. It is human nature to believe that you are entitled to that which
you own, and any attempt to persuade otherwise would be futile. In light of
this intense resistance, there must be some type of benefit conferred upon
the property owner who, essentially, loses everything in a typical condem-
nation proceeding.
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, applied to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment, provides that any taking must be accompanied by
"just compensation." The Framers used "just," a term that is utterly inde-
finable in and of itself, to provide flexibility for circumstances that will
inevitably vary from taking to taking. If the Framers' intent was to create a
set measure for compensation, they could have specified so in the Fifth
Amendment or simply left "just" out of it altogether. Therefore, there is
clearly a reason for the insertion of "just."
243. See Brief of the American Planning Association, supra note 30, at 27; cf Kelo v. City of New
London, 545 U.S. 469, 475. Petitioner Wilhelmina Dery was born in her house in 1918 and has lived
there ever since.
244. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473-77 (involving circumstances where a private homeowner was unwilling
to sell property for an economic development project, requiring the use of eminent domain and transfer
of property to a private corporation).
245. In Commodities, the Court specifically rejected this idea, but the underlying facts of the case
are distinguishable enough to warrant an ideological shift. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp.,
339 U.S. 121, 130-31 (1950).
246. Determining this share would, admittedly, be incredibly difficult.
247. More research is necessary to determine the realities of these proposed options. However, any
one of these options would surely change the way in which the American public feels about the Takings
Clause, and, more importantly, the enhanced compensation would allow people to understand that
eminent domain for economic purpose is not necessarily a bad thing.
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In a post-Kelo era, any challenges to the proposed "public purpose" of
a condemnation will ultimately fail. Given that, it is the duty of state legis-
lators, or perhaps if litigated, the duty of the Court, to determine that under
circumstances similar to those seen in Kelo, a higher level of compensation
is warranted to satisfy the requirement set forth in the Constitution. Federal
legislation that seeks to effectively eliminate the exercise of eminent do-
main for economic takings is not the solution.248 If this legislation is to
succeed, the socioeconomic benefits that result from economic takings will
be sacrificed, and the states will have little power to actively improve a
distressed community. Additionally, job opportunities that are created from
such exercises of eminent domain will also be destroyed. Supporters of the
federal legislation 24 9 seem to overlook these beneficial characteristics of
economic takings and, in the process, lobby for the elimination of an effec-
tive state means of preservation and improvement. Therefore, these sup-
porters should redirect their efforts towards balancing out the process,
which necessarily involves reforming how states treat the issue of just
compensation.
Individual property owners have never had rights that supersede those
of the general public, and this principle is exemplified by the holding in
Kelo.250 Can a person convincingly declare that he is entitled to the use and
enjoyment of his property at the expense of others?25 1 Should potential job
opportunities for the unemployed be sacrificed because an individual prop-
erty owner prefers to dine in his home, as opposed to somewhere else?
Should tax benefits to an entire town, resulting in a variety of improve-
ments for all its citizens, be extinguished because a single property owner
desires to sit in his rocking chair on his porch? All of these questions must
be answered in the negative.
The inquiry remains, however, how should these private property
owners, who are forced to sacrifice their own use and enjoyment of their
property for the common good, be compensated? Fair market value cannot
be considered "just" under circumstances where the taking is justified for
economic purposes. If the entire community, as well as a private corpora-
tion, is benefiting from the condemnation, then why should the victims of
eminent domain not benefit as well? Even economists would agree that fair
248. See H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005).
249. Id.
250. As well as the holdings in Berman v. Parker and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Mid/off.
251. The common law of nuisance was developed to remedy situations where an individual's use of
property had an adverse effect on surrounding property owners' use and enjoyment. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979).
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market value does little to balance out the losses with the gains. 252 There-
fore, a greater amount of compensation is necessary in order to make the
purported protections of the Constitution a reality. Moreover, reforming the
way in which compensation is determined is vital to restoring public faith
in the government, and it is necessary for the future success of eminent
domain.
252. See SAMUEL R. STALEY & JOHN P. BLAIR, EMINENT DOMAIN, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND
REDEVELOPMENT: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2005).
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